Introduction 1
In the past decades, multinational enterprises (MNEs) have increasingly come to be seen 2 as differentiated networks where the roles of individual units vary according to their specific 3 capabilities and the internal and external networks they are embedded in (Andersson and 4 Forsgren, 2000; Doz and Prahalad, 1991; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997) . 5 Within this network view, much of the focus has been on subsidiaries and their increasingly 6 complex roles inside the MNE (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989 ), but in recent years, we have begun 7
to witness a growing scholarly interest in the role played and value added by headquarters (HQ) 8 (Ambos and Mahnke, 2010; Andersson and Holm, 2010; Egelhoff, 2010) . 9 Despite this growing interest, few studies have examined in a systematic manner what 10 headquarters actually do, and conceptualisations of HQ roles have yet to be linked to specific 11 activities performed. The HQ literature also appears somewhat disconnected from the literature 12 on regional headquarters (RHQs), despite the fact that both of them address the same core 13 question: how to effectively govern complex, differentiated organisations operating in complex, 14 differentiated environments. While progress is being made in connecting these perspectives by 15 arguing that HQ functions can be performed at various levels of the MNE (Goold and Campbell, 16 2002; Kähäri et al., 2010; Piekkari et al., 2010) , the regional management literature remains 17 largely under-theorised and short on detail about how HQ functions are actually performed at the 18 regional level. In particular, little attention has been paid to the nature and characteristics of units 19 that perform HQ functions at a regional level -for example, whether these units are fully 20 dedicated to their regional role or are required to perform other roles as well -and how such 21 characteristics may affect their ability to fulfil their roles effectively. 22 In this paper, we build on the view that in complex MNEs, HQ functions may be 1 distributed across the organisation and are not necessarily performed by dedicated RHQ units 2 only (Lasserre, 1996; Piekkari et al., 2010; Schütte, 1997) . We examine the delegation of HQ 3 functions to local operating subsidiaries, a phenomenon that we first encountered in the field and 4
termed regional management mandates (RMMs). Despite being used by MNEs in various parts 5 of the world, this phenomenon has yet to be properly addressed in the literature. We believe there 6
are strong reasons why RMMs should be treated as conceptually different from dedicated RHQs: 7 in particular, their potential cost and efficiency advantages over RHQs. We define an RHQ as an 8 administratively focused entity which dedicates all of its time and resources to performing 9 regional HQ roles. In contrast, a RMM denotes a mandate given to a profit-oriented local 10 subsidiary that is mandated to dedicate some of its time and resources to performing regional HQ 11 roles. We argue that this difference in focus is likely to have an impact on how delegated HQ 12 functions may be performed and warrants further investigation. Our paper explores two research 13 questions, using a case study of Unilever and its cluster of tightly coupled subsidiaries in 14 Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia: 15 16 delegated to operating subsidiaries in the form of regional management mandates? 17
RQ1: What are the key functions of headquarters, and to what extent can they be

RQ2: What are the benefits and drawbacks of delegating these functions to operating 18 subsidiaries, as opposed to dedicated regional headquarters? 19
Our study makes two major contributions. Firstly, we develop a typology of HQ functions 20 performed at three different levels of the MNE, thus extending existing approaches -which have 21 tended to focus on a single level -into a more integrative classification. Secondly, we draw on 22 three interlinked theoretical perspectives as well as a rich empirical case to develop propositions 23 about the potential benefits and drawbacks of using regional management mandates. Our findings 24 suggest that RMMs can offer considerable advantages over establishing dedicated RHQs in small 25 regions: (1) balance between integration and responsiveness at levels below the efficient scale for 1 dedicated RHQs; (2) the exploitation of local operational expertise on a regional level; and (3) 2 relieving headquarters of the burden of monitoring remote peripheral agents. At the same time, 3 there are also potential risks in using RMMs to manage 'satellite' subsidiaries at the edge of the 4 MNE's reach: (1) the question of legitimacy and acceptance of operational subsidiaries as 5 intermediate authorities; and (2) issues arising from the lack of visibility of ground-level 6 organisational tensions at the top of the MNE. Through our exploration of these issues, we 7 provide a potentially fruitful new perspective on how HQ functions are implemented at the 8 regional level, and contribute to the discussion about the core role and purpose of corporate 9 headquarters in the contemporary MNE. 10 
2.
Conceptual background 11 
The roles, functions and tasks of headquarters in the MNE
12
In early MNE research, corporate HQ was thought of as the default locus of hierarchical 13 decision-making and control (Bower, 1970; Chandler, 1962) , while the specific functions of HQ 14 were rarely examined in depth. More recently, MNEs have been characterised as complex 15 differentiated networks, explicitly recognising that many of their strategic capabilities and 16 resources reside at the subsidiary level (Doz and Prahalad, 1991; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990 ; 17 Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997 descriptive, and the classification of the functions performed by RHQs is incomplete and under-8 theorised. Using our original typology presented in Table 1 , we synthesise the extant literature on 9 RHQ functions in Table 2 . 10
Insert Table 2 about here  11 Most of the tasks identified in Table 2 from the regional management literature essentially  12 represent regional versions of the same tasks found at the HQ level (e.g. regional strategic 13 planning, monitoring, etc). However, we also see some differences, notably in Function 7: when 14 performed at the regional level, this function involves not only external representation (liaising 15 with customers, governments etc.), but also internal representation (liaising between HQ and 16 local units), which creates an additional dimension. Meanwhile, we did not find a mention of 17 tasks relating to driving organisational adaptation (Function 4). While this function is explicitly 18 noted by Piekkari et al (2010) who examine HQ roles both at global and regional levels, they 19 suggest that initiating organisational adaptation is the primary responsibility of corporate HQ, 20 rather than RHQs. As such, it appears that not all HQ functions may be delegated to RHQs. 21 Very few authors note the possibility of HQ functions being delegated to local operating 1 subsidiaries -as opposed to dedicated RHQs -despite practical evidence to the contrary 2 (Businessline, 2004; Rees, 1996) . When discussing HQ functions being performed at regional 3 levels, most studies do not distinguish between dedicated RHQs and local subsidiaries with 4 regional responsibilities. The latter -which we term regional management mandates (RMMs) -5 is at most briefly noted (Kähäri et al., 2010; Lasserre, 1996; Piekkari et al., 2010; Schütte, 1997) . 6 We argue that there is an important distinction between delegating HQ functions to 7 administratively oriented units (RHQs) and to profit-oriented subsidiaries (RMMs), whose 8 implications for regional management warrant closer investigation. We discuss these next. 9
Delegating headquarters functions to operating subsidiaries
10
When trying to understand or explain complex problems, scholars have often noted the 11 merits of combining theories (Doz and Prahalad, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989) . Since the delegation of 12 HQ functions to operating subsidiaries via RMMs is a complex phenomenon which is yet to be 13 explored in the literature, we chose three different but closely linked theoretical lenses to frame 14 our empirical investigation: contingency theory, information processing theory and agency 15 theory. All three perspectives have been used or been suggested for use in studies of headquarters sharing fundamental concepts such as 'fit', 'information' and 'structure', which allows a 19 comprehensive picture to emerge from the findings derived using each of the three perspectives. 20
Contingency perspective 1
At its heart, the key argument of contingency theory is that an organisation's structure 2 must follow its strategy, which itself must follow environmental imperatives (Chandler, 1962; 3 Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) . Hence, the optimal structure for any organisation is contingent on 4 its specific strategy within its specific environment, and optimal performance is contingent on the 5 'fit' between environment, strategy and structure. The finding by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 6 that organisations must balance differentiation and integration to be successful can be seen as a 7 direct precursor to the integration-responsiveness (IR) framework developed in the 1980s 8 (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Prahalad and Doz, 1987) . While the original IR framework was 9 focused on global integration versus local responsiveness, scholars soon highlighted the role of 10 IR pressures at the regional level, and their impact on MNE strategy and structure (Ghemawat, 11 2005; Lehrer and Asakawa, 1999; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004) . Arguably, a regional strategy 12 holds the ideal balance between integration and responsiveness: it keeps costs low by exploiting 13 regional scale economies, while earning high revenues by adapting to regional differences in 14 business environments and consumer preferences (Daniels, 1987; Morrison et al., 1991; Morrison 15 and Roth, 1992; Paik and Sohn, 2004; Schütte, 1997) . 16 To the extent that the MNE chooses to pursue a regional strategy, it is likely to develop 17 some form of regional structure to match, such as clustering subsidiaries into regional groups 18 based on geographical proximity and institutional, cultural or market similarities (see Egelhoff, 19 1982; Ghemawat, 2005) . While this is most commonly done by establishing dedicated RHQs, 20 Lasserre (1996) notes that building and maintaining a dedicated office (either in a separate 21 physical location or within the HQ) and employing regional-level directors to look after a 22 particular region is a high-cost solution. As an alternative, he suggests that certain regional 23 management tasks may be fulfilled more cost-effectively by mandating existing local subsidiaries 1 as management centres, particularly in small or fragmented markets. This idea is also echoed in 2 Schütte's (1997) notion of 'virtual regional headquarters'. Under this set-up, RHQ functions are 3 fulfilled by local directors and managers on top of their local activities. In theory, this should not 4 incur significant extra costs (provided the local subsidiary has sufficient resources to fulfil the 5 extra functions), which allows this solution to be employed at levels of regional aggregation 6
where the cost of a fully-fledged RHQ would be prohibitive. We argue that this allows the MNE 7 to achieve a more fine-grained balance between integration and responsiveness. 8
Information processing perspective 9
The information processing approach was developed around the same time as contingency 10 theory began to gain currency, and explicitly builds on it (Egelhoff, 1982; Galbraith, 1973 ; 11 Tushman and Nadler, 1978) . Information processing refers to 'the gathering, interpreting and 12 synthesis of information in the context of organisational decision making' (Tushman and Nadler, 13 1978, p.614), and is a vital but resource-intensive component of managing organisations. The 14 theory distinguishes between different types of information processing: strategic (high-level, 15 broad, long-term) versus tactical (low-level, narrow, short-term) and posits that different 16 structures facilitate one while restricting the other (Egelhoff, 1982) . Organisational effectiveness 17 is thus a function of the fit between information processing requirements (shaped by 18 environmental conditions) and information processing capabilities (determined by features of 19 organisational design). To survive, firms must develop information processing mechanisms 20 capable of dealing with complexity and uncertainty from various internal and external sources 21 (Egelhoff, 2010; Galbraith, 1973; Tushman and Nadler, 1978) . 22 Information processing theory is well suited to study HQ functions and RHQs and has 1 been used by several scholars (Collis et al., 2007; Egelhoff, 2010; Piekkari et al., 2010) . Due to 2 the growth in the geographical reach of MNEs, the processing of large volumes of diverse local 3 information requires increasingly tailored information processing capabilities. While the 4 corporate HQ and dedicated RHQs tend to be good at the processing of high-level strategic 5 information, they are less effective at dealing with low-level tactical information. In particular, as 6
Ghemawhat (2005) notes, administratively oriented RHQs tend to suffer from weak links to 7 subsidiaries' operating activities. This may be seen as a result of an insufficient fit between their 8 information processing capabilities (largely strategic) and the information processing 9 requirements of local environments (largely tactical). Hence, to reduce the risk of missed 10 opportunities, inappropriate products or resources wasted on ill-advised interventions, there is a 11 need to increase discretion at the operating level (Hamel and Prahalad, 1983) , while also 12 coordinating information processing to capture scale economies in routine tasks such as payroll 13 processing (Collis et al., 2007) . The delegation of HQ functions to local operating subsidiaries 14 presents a solution to this problem. Since the primary role of local directors and managers is to 15 engage in business activities on their own market, it is reasonable to expect that they will be able 16 to link their day-to-day operating experience to higher-level functions delegated to them. As 17 such, the knowledge accumulated in key individuals in a local subsidiary can be exploited on a 18 regional level without removing them from their primary role on the local market, thus allowing 19 more efficient information processing. 20
Agency perspective 21
Agency theory is linked to both contingency theory and information processing theory. Its 22 basic assumptions are bounded rationality, information asymmetry and goal incongruence 23 between principal and agent, and it is concerned with the optimal structuring of control 1 relationships in order to minimise agency costs (agent behaviour that is not in the best interest of 2 the principal) and managing the trade-off between the cost of monitoring behaviour and the cost 3 of monitoring outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . MNE 4 governance can be aptly conceptualised in terms of agency relationships where the HQ 5 (principal) seeks to maintain control over subsidiaries (agents) that would generally prefer to act 6 autonomously (Paterson and Brock, 2002) . Subsidiary behaviour may be monitored by using 7 expatriates (distributed agents) to supervise and report on the day-to-day activities of the 8 subsidiary, while outcomes can be monitored by setting sales and financial targets for the 9 subsidiary to meet. Monitoring outcomes is generally low-cost, but may not be a reliable 10 indicator of effort when the subsidiary's tasks are complex, while monitoring behaviour tends to 11 be more effective in complex operating environments, but at a much higher cost. 12
With regards to HQ functions, maintaining control becomes more difficult as the number 13 of divisions and markets served increases, as there are more numerous and diverse agents for HQ 14 to manage and monitoring behaviour becomes increasingly costly, especially in peripheral 15 subsidiaries (Benito et al., 2011) . By delegating monitoring and coordination functions to RHQs 16 or 'intermediate parents', HQ can reduce the number of agents it needs to manage directly (Goold 17 and Campbell, 2002). However, due to their high cost, dedicated RHQs tend to have limited staff 18 who must divide their attention amongst several subsidiaries, meaning they are constrained in 19 their ability to monitor peripheral subsidiaries' behaviour on a day-to-day basis. By appointing 20 this 'intermediate principal' role to an operating subsidiary instead, HQ can access a larger pool 21 of employees who are able to monitor the behaviour of agents in other subsidiaries. Given that 22 these employees are already engaged in operating activities, the information asymmetry between 23 those doing the monitoring and those being monitored is reduced, thus reducing monitoring costs. 24 Our theoretical discussion shows that the delegation of HQ functions to operating units 1 through RMMs can hold advantages over the use of dedicated RHQs. As noted before, there is 2 evidence from the practitioner literature that this is considered a viable option by some MNEs -3 however, to date, no academic research has been conducted to provide empirical evidence for 4 this, or to investigate which of the HQ functions and tasks noted in Tables 1 and 2 may be  5 performed by operating subsidiaries. We now turn to investigate this empirically. 6 
Methodology and context
Case study methodology
15
Given the lack of prior academic attention to regional management mandates, an 16 exploratory approach was the most suitable for our study. Our methodological approach is best 17 described as abductive: it starts with theory, but involves constant interplay between theory and 18 data in order to develop and refine propositions which offer the most plausible explanation for 19 our observations (Dew, 2007; Peirce, 1960) . We conduct an in-depth single case study (see Stake, 20 1995; Yin, 2003) of Unilever Hungary, which holds a RMM to manage two of Unilever's 21 peripheral 'satellite' subsidiaries in Croatia and Slovenia. Our time frame is defined as the period 22 from 1997 to 2007, starting with Unilever Hungary's RMM appointment and finishing just as the 1 subsidiary began to prepare for a significant reorganisation. time, we present our findings in the context of the specific organisational structure in place at the 6 time that our data was collected: a country cluster comprising three countries and reporting to 7
Unilever's European HQ. Most of our primary data was constructed from retrospective accounts 8 by respondents, gathered through semi-structured interviews and respondents' sketches. This data 9 was supplemented and triangulated through the use of publicly available data sources such as 10 websites and reports. To present a sense of the three subsidiaries' differing operating contexts, 11 key indicators and features of the three countries' business environments are shown in Table 3 . 12
Insert Table 3 about here  13 Our analysis is based on interviews with eighteen respondents from Unilever Hungary 14 and two from the CEE regional level. Some respondents granted us repeat interviews, taking the 15 total number of interviews used to twenty-five. We interviewed respondents at all but the very 16 highest work level, which allowed us to explore RMM involvement at various operational levels. 17
Insert Table 4 about here  18 All interviews were conducted by the same member of the research team, who is bilingual 19 in Hungarian and English. Interviews at Unilever Hungary were conducted in Hungarian, 20 allowing greater freedom of expression, rapport-building and richness of the data (see Welch and 1 Piekkari, 2006 ). The two interviews at the CEE level were conducted in English with non-native 2 speakers whose command of English was at an extremely high level, given that it is Unilever's 3 corporate language. As such, it may be said that linguistically, all interviews were conducted on a 4 'neutral platform' (Welch and Piekkari, 2006) . Interviews ranged from 30 to 120 minutes in 5 length, and all but one were recorded and transcribed. Hungarian-language interviews were 6 translated into English by the same researcher, who was able to scrutinise potential meanings in 7 both languages as well as closely evoke the interview context during translation. Being familiar 8
with 'everyday speak' (metaphors, social expressions, historical and cultural references etc.) as 9 well as 'company speak' (operating terms, value statements etc.) in both languages helped to 10 generate authentic and well-contextualised translations; and the translation process itself allowed 11 deeper meanings to emerge. Of course, the 'problematic of translation' (Welch and Piekkari, 12
2006) could not be avoided: the interpretation element of translation means that a risk of potential 13 bias can never be completely eliminated. We minimised this risk by regularly comparing 14 translated accounts of events and phenomena with accounts in the English-language interviews, 15
and by revising and refining expressions in the translated data over time during data analysis. 16
Data analysis 17
We used the NVivo software and two basic strategies to analyse our qualitative data 18 (Richards, 2005) . First, we used topic coding, which followed a data-driven logic and allowed us 19 to categorise and make sense of the rich data we collected about topics such as Unilever's 20 complex organisational structure and the different demands of the three countries' business 21 environments. Secondly, we used analytical coding, which involved coding the data into an 22 evolving structure according to the main theoretical concepts and ideas identified from our 23 literature review. Our overall analytical process relied on the theoretical inputs into our research 1 as well as on our empirical data. Our findings are presented in the next section. 2 3 Unilever is one of the world's largest manufacturers of fast-moving consumer goods 4 (FMCG), with an annual turnover of around €44bn (Unilever, 2010) . The company manages a 5 highly diversified portfolio of branded products (foods, toiletries and household cleaners) and 6 operates in a sector characterised by high pressure for local responsiveness (differing consumer 7 tastes, especially in the foods business) as well as for global integration (major advantages from 8 leveraging brands such as Cornetto, Dove or Domestos). During our data collection (2005) (2006) (2007) , 9 Unilever's regional structure consisted of various levels: three 'triads', six regions and numerous 10 sub-regions/country clusters. Our research focuses on the sub-region/country cluster headed by 11 Unilever Hungary within the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, which includes 12
Context and empirical case
Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia. 13
Unilever has been present in the CEE region since the early twentieth century. Its We find evidence that several of the functions that constitute the headquarters' 2 entrepreneurial role can be regularly performed at the level of operating subsidiaries. In Unilever 3 Hungary (ULH), these include strategic direction (Function 1), with respondents indicating that 4 the Slovenian and Croatian businesses are driven from Hungary 'on an extended market base ', 5 where the Hungarian unit receives strategic plans and frameworks from HQ and has the 6 responsibility of 'translating' these to the three countries. Although respondents emphasised that 7 this strategic planning process happened with the involvement of their Croatian and Slovenian 8 colleagues, the authority to sign off project plans rested with managers and directors at ULH, 9 underlining its role in driving strategic planning in the context of the country cluster. 10 Our data suggests that ULH was responsible for HR recruitment in all three countries, and 11
historically it had been engaged in resource development on a regional level (Function 2). 12
Between 1998 and 2004, the Nyírbátor factory in Eastern Hungary housed a regional innovation 13 centre (RIC) which created new products for regional markets (such as a thick, economical Cif 14 cleaning paste for low-income consumers). In addition, the Hungarian HR team created new 15 processes for the region (career path models, leadership development training packages), some of 16 which were later transferred to HQ. However, due to Unilever's centralisation strategy from 2004 17 onwards, this resource development function has been significantly reduced in ULH. 18 We noted the key role of ULH in seeking and exploiting new opportunities (Function 3). 
Integrative role 1
We find evidence that through its RMM, Unilever Hungary performs an important 2 integrative role at the cluster level. This entails a strong element of monitoring and control 3 (Function 6), as the board of ULH is formally accountable for the performance of the Croatian 4
and Slovenian subsidiaries and is responsible for ensuring that all three countries conform to 5
Unilever's increasingly centralised processes. Our data suggests that this task is clear and 6
unambiguous for employees at the highest work levels: the cluster chairman (W5) and the 7 business unit directors (WL4) are required to visit the Croatian and Slovenian subsidiaries on a 8 regular basis and conduct strategic reviews/performance evaluations every 3-6 months. However 
care team is integrated into the operations, what new things there are…then they go on trade
visits where they can see Tesco's operations [which do not exist in Croatia or Slovenia]."
13
In particular, we note that while less intense forms of knowledge sharing are found across 14 the entire CEE region, and even upwards on the European stage, more intense forms of 15 knowledge sharing appear to be reserved for use within the cluster only. This is most likely 16 because they require greater commitment and incur higher resource and opportunity costs, which 17 can only be justified by the formal accountability aspect of Unilever Hungary's RMM. 18 ULH acts as a representative of the two satellite subsidiaries towards CEE, European and 19 global headquarters (Function 8), acting as a regional liaison with HQ and attending higher-level 20 meetings on behalf of the three countries. As a result, there is limited contact between HQ and 21 satellite subsidiaries. We find that in ULH's case, this mediation function is geared primarily 22 towards internal (rather than external) relationships. One reason for this may be that as a local 23 operational subsidiary, ULH lacks the clout to deal with governments and customers on a 24 regional basis, and is better suited to the management of internal relations. 25
Our data also suggests that Unilever Hungary's RMM involves a considerable amount of 1 cross-border coordination and harmonisation (Function 9). Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia 'have 2 a single back office system, a single SAP, a single board of directors', and support functions such 3 as finance, IT and other back office operations are performed at the Hungarian subsidiary for all 4 three countries. In addition, we found plenty of evidence of resource pooling in the form of joint 5 procurement of promotional and point-of-sale items (promotional gifts, branded display shelves, 6 advertising banners) geared towards cost efficiency. Similarly to monitoring, coordination and 7 harmonisation is stronger in marketing and weaker in sales and trade marketing where the 8 significant differences in the three countries' retail structures limit coordination possibilities. 9 We find that even in functions where formal harmonisation is not possible, considerable 10 effort is put into informal integration (Function 10). Middle and top managers in sales and trade 11 marketing reveal that even though they have no formal control over Croatia and Slovenia, they 12 engage in regular operational support, training and external workshops. The relatively informal 13 nature of these integration efforts is evident from a trade marketing manager's account: 14 
17
Overall, we find strong evidence that Unilever Hungary performs a strong integrative role 18 at the level of the cluster. The entrepreneurial and integrative roles we found as part of ULH's 19 regional management mandate are summarised in Table 5 . Next, we revisit our second research 20 question to examine the benefits of delegating HQ functions to operating subsidiaries. 21
Insert Table 5 about here 22 
Potential benefits and drawbacks of regional management mandates
Integration-responsiveness advantages of regional management mandates 2
In Section 2.3.1, we argued that regional management mandates add value to the MNE by 3 allowing a fit between regional strategy and structure at a level where the costs of a dedicated 4 RHQ would be prohibitive. Empirically, we find evidence for both parts of this argument (fit as 5 well as cost efficiency). The reason that Unilever developed a cluster structure based on RMMs is 6 perhaps most succinctly summed up by the CEE regional director: 7 
12
In other words, from a contingency perspective, markets such as Slovenia and Croatia are 13 considered important enough to merit a locally differentiated strategy, but their small size means 14 they cannot support a matching structure. As a business unit director notes: 'In a small country, 15 obviously, there is a lack of critical mass, the size that allows it to sustain a particular 16 organisation'. In such a case, entrusting small local units to the care of a larger, geographically 17 close and well-established unit such as Unilever Hungary allows integration at the cluster level 18 while also preserving responsiveness at the local level, which may be the best strategy-structure 19 fit under these circumstances. In addition, as respondents noted, Unilever's multinational 20 customers and competitors are similarly organised in the region, therefore matching their 21 structure adds value by allowing Unilever to negotiate more efficiently at various levels. 22
With regards to our cost efficiency argument, although we did not have access to 23 respondents at the HQ level who could confirm whether RMMs indeed represent cost savings 24 over establishing RHQs at the same level, we find indirect evidence that establishing an RMM 25 does not require significant resource investment from HQ (unlike establishing a RHQ). In the 1 case of Unilever Hungary, strong existing financial and human resources and self-sufficiency 2 were repeatedly cited as the key reason why the subsidiary received its RMM, which would 3 suggest that RMMs are given to subsidiaries which are able to perform regional HQ functions 4 with no need for added investment. Therefore, it would be logical to deduce that RMMs are 5 regarded by the company as a cost-effective use of resources. More directly, our data suggests 6 that cost savings arising from the use of existing resources for monitoring, coordination and 7 knowledge transfer are an important aspect of Unilever Hungary's RMM. The value added by 8 resource pooling, in particular, was emphasised by several respondents. As a marketing manager 9 notes, 'without the size and strength of the Hungarian business, everything is a lot more 10 expensive for [Unilever Croatia and Unilever Slovenia] '. Given the small size of these 11 subsidiaries, it is no wonder that scale economies achieved through cluster-level resource pooling 12 are highly valued: according to a business development manager, 'there is a lower level of 13
profitability in the whole of Central and Eastern Europe, because only two countries, the 14
Russians and the Poles, have an efficient scale'. At the same time, the value added by 15 maintaining knowledgeable local teams in each country is also strongly emphasised, which 16 suggests that there are limits to the potential for cross-country integration. On the whole, our data 17 yields qualitative evidence that the use of RMMs at the sub-regional level allows Unilever to 18 fine-tune responsiveness to diverse local markets, as well as exploit cost savings and operational 19 scale economies across borders. This leads us to suggest the following proposition: 20 
'childhood diseases'…all this experience was accumulated there, it simply had to be 24 implemented [in other markets]'. 25
Looking beyond the establishment of new operations and focusing on the ongoing 1 management of satellite subsidiaries, we find further evidence of tactical information processing 2 capabilities at the subsidiary level which are successfully exploited at the cluster level. ULH's 3 operational expertise in the highly competitive, fast-growing Hungarian market was seen by 4 respondents as vital to manage the satellite subsidiaries in Croatia and Slovenia, particularly with 5 regards to effective knowledge sharing. As we highlighted in Section 4.1.2, knowledge sharing is 6 an important aspect of Unilever Hungary's RMM, and the subsidiary's accumulated expertise is 7 acknowledged and sought after by the Slovenian and Croatian units because it was developed in 8 the unique regional environment of Central and Eastern Europe. As the Hungarian sales director 9 points out, the CEE retail environment has developed in a very different manner from Western 10 Europe where local chains with long histories tend to dominate national markets: 11 
"In Germany, it is the German [retailers], in the UK it is the British ones…Well, what
15
We have to live up to this, which is a challenge in itself. " 
16
Thus, it may be said that the unique information processing requirements of dealing with 17 a variety of multinational retailers (Tesco, Lidl, Auchan etc.) as well as with local/regional chains 18 and buying groups (CBA, Reál) foster the development of specialised and wide-ranging 19 information processing capabilities. We find strong evidence that through Unilever Hungary's 20 RMM, these capabilities are being exploited and passed on to Unilever Slovenia and Unilever 21 Croatia. This allows us to generate a second proposition: 22 
Agency advantages and disadvantages of regional management mandates 1
In Section 2.3.3, we argues that delegating HQ functions through regional management 2 mandates adds value to the MNE by reducing the cost of monitoring peripheral agents ' 3 behaviour. In the context of our case, Unilever Hungary can be viewed as an agent of HQ and 4 intermediate principal to Unilever Croatia and Unilever Slovenia, which are satellite subsidiaries 5 seen as peripheral agents operating in markets that are of low strategic importance for the MNE. 6
Although our empirical investigation was limited by our lack of access to Unilever HQ, we found 7 indications that allocating RMMs to subsidiaries such as Unilever Hungary can reduce 8 monitoring costs for HQ. As a business unit director noted, 'an organisation can operate more 9 efficiently if, instead of twenty-something CEE countries, the headquarters has to negotiate with 10 and communicate through just five cluster-leading ones, so…the task is to create clusters'. As 11 noted in Section 4.1.2, Unilever Hungary fulfils a strong monitoring and control function: it is 12 held responsible for ensuring the timely and accurate implementation of central directives in the 13 cluster, and bears the costs of monitoring the two satellite units through day-to-day contact and 14 regular visits between the countries. The relatively small geographical distance and close 15 operating links between the three subsidiaries means that information asymmetry is reduced, 16 which allows the monitoring function to be performed by ULH more efficiently than by 17 geographically and organisationally distant principals such as HQ or higher-level RHQs. This 18 finding allows us to introduce the following proposition: 19 In addition to the potential benefits of using RMMs, our data also revealed potential risks 24 that appear to stem from the nature of the principal-agent relationship between Unilever HQ and 25 Unilever Hungary. Despite the fact that every respondent we talked to was aware of Unilever 1 Hungary's mandate to oversee and manage operations in Croatia and Slovenia, and most of them 2 were actively involved in this task, we found a notable lack of clarity at the operational level 3 about what the RMM actually entailed. In the words of a Hungarian trade marketing manager, 4
'even Unilever could not define exactly how these two countries were connected to us'. When 5 probing a senior level director expatriated by HQ to Hungary about whether the RMM 6 arrangement was formally recorded, the response was: 7 
10
From an agency perspective, this highlights the existence of incomplete contracts between 11 HQ and subsidiaries (see Foss, 1997 ) and raises intriguing questions about how principals can 12 ultimately monitor the fulfilment of duties that have not been explicitly defined or recorded. 13
When asked about HQ mechanisms to monitor how well RMMs are fulfilled, the same director 14 cited financial performance (monitoring outcomes) and levels of knowledge and professionalism 15 in the satellite units (monitoring behaviour). Arguably, these are relatively crude measurements 16 for such a complex task as an RMM, raising questions about the extent to which the principal is 17 able -or even willing -to monitor the behaviour of agents in complex contexts. 18
Resulting from this incompleteness of the RMM contract between Unilever HQ and 19
Unilever Hungary, we identified a set of underlying tensions that can be helpfully conceptualised 20 in agency terms. As noted in Section 4. We also note that inserting extra layers of regional management between the ultimate 23 principal and the MNE's lowest-level agents can also have negative consequences for the latter. subsidiaries. Nonetheless, what is remarkable about the tensions we note in this particular 10 relationship is that they are taking place at the periphery of the MNE -the 'edge of the empire' -11 so far removed from the central locus of decision-making that they become virtually invisible to 12 corporate HQ. Thus, in a large, complex firm such as Unilever -given the number of regional 13 management layers between the HQ and operating units -it may appear from the headquarters ' 14 perspective that delegating monitoring, coordination and other functions to operating units 15 'solves' coordination problems, whereas in reality, these problems are merely shifted down to a 16 level that is no longer visible to central decision-makers. As a result, problems may fester at the 17 periphery, potentially leading to subversion and resistance, with no awareness or intervention 18 from the headquarters. This forms the basis of our final proposition: 19 Arguably, these peripheral tensions may be a necessary price to pay in order for HQ to be 24 able to cope with the information processing and decision-making demands of its role. However, 25 we speculate that by paying more attention to clarifying and formalising principal-agent roles at 1 all levels of the MNE, the headquarters may be able to reduce the potential for conflict at the 2 'edge of the empire' and make the overall organisational network run more smoothly. 3 One of the main contributions of this paper has been to develop an integrated typology of 22 headquarters' activities (roles, functions and tasks), which -to the best of our knowledge -is the 23 first to systematically compare how HQ activities are performed at three different organisational 1 levels. Our study suggests that most HQ functions can, at least to some extent, be distributed to 2 lower levels of the organisation, with the apparent exception of driving organisational adaptation 3 and institutionalising strategic change (Function 4 in our typology). This finding seems to be in 4 line with other recent studies that suggest this function is the most important responsibility of 5 corporate HQ, which may explain why it is kept at the top (Piekkari et al., 2010; Tallman and 6 Koza, 2010). Nonetheless, it is possible that some aspects of this function could in fact be 7 distributed to regional levels, but they simply happen not to be delegated in our case company or 8 in the (arguably limited) regional management literature. The inherent difficulty in trying to 9 reduce such a complex phenomenon to a relatively simple typology also means that there remains 10 a lot more to be learnt about the core roles, functions and tasks of headquarters. 11
Conclusions
With regards to the choice between regional headquarters (RHQs) and regional 12 management mandates (RMMs), our study suggests that most of the functions performed by 13 dedicated RHQs can also be performed by operational subsidiaries with RMMs, potentially with 14 greater efficiency and at a lower cost. However, there is one function which requires a dedicated 15 regional unit and cannot be delegated to existing local units: attention and signalling (Function 16 5). The establishment of an RHQ signifies the HQ's attention and commitment to a specific 17 region in a way that establishing operational, profit-oriented units in a country simply cannot -as 18 such, we believe that this finding is likely to hold not only in our case but also in general. 19 The other main contribution of our study is a set of propositions regarding the potential 20 benefits and drawbacks of using RMMs for regional management. These propositions suggest 21 that RMMs can offer considerable advantages over establishing dedicated RHQs in small 22 regions: (1) balance between integration and responsiveness at levels below the efficient scale for 23 dedicated RHQs; (2) the exploitation of local operational expertise on a regional level; and (3) 24 relieving headquarters of the burden of monitoring remote peripheral agents. In complex MNEs 1 such as Unilever, the HQ is so far removed from many of its local markets that there is a risk of it 2 being 'everywhere and nowhere', and we argue that RMMs form an important part of the toolkit 3 of MNEs to try and develop effectively in new, peripheral or transitional markets. The ability to 4 distribute HQ functions through RMMs allows MNEs to come as close to local markets as 5 possible, without becoming what Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) call multidomestic MNEs. 6
Historically, this is exactly the type of MNE that Unilever had been, before moving towards 7 greater integration in order to remain competitive in the global fast-moving consumer goods 8 market. Unilever's particular administrative heritage may be a reason why the company has 9 chosen to use RMMs as a way to preserve local responsiveness while also pursuing regional and 10 global integration, and it would be interesting to compare our findings with future studies on the 11 use of RMMs in firms with different administrative heritages (cf. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) . 12
At the same time, our findings also suggest that there are potential risks in using RMMs 13 to manage peripheral 'satellite' subsidiaries at the edge of the MNE's reach: (1) the question of 14 legitimacy and acceptance of operational subsidiaries as intermediate principals; and (2) issues 15 arising from the lack of visibility of ground-level organisational tensions at the top of the MNE. 16 These findings serve as a reminder of the importance of the concepts of authority and visibility, 17 which are traditional hallmarks of headquarters and regional headquarters as actors in the overall 18 corporate network. They also highlight potential avenues for further investigations, such as an 19 empirical comparison between the functions of dedicated RHQs and operating subsidiaries with 20
RMMs; an examination of RMMs from a micro-political and power perspective; as well as a 21 sensemaking and sensegiving approach to RMMs. 22
Together, our typologies and propositions provide a foundation for further research on the 23 distributed functions of headquarters and the use of RMMs for regional management. In-process 24 methodologies on organisational innovation that capture the change and evolution of RMMs, and 1 link these to both the internal and external context of the MNE, would be particularly valuable in 2 exploring our ideas further and enable the development of a dynamic perspective on RMMs. In 3 taking the ideas developed in this paper forward, it would also be particularly useful to conduct 4 comparative studies across different industry contexts. Our study has been limited to the fast-5 moving consumer goods (FMCG) manufacturing industry, which may constrain the extent to 6 which our findings may be transferred to other industries. However, given the interdependence 7 between the FMCG manufacturing industry and the grocery retail industry, it would not be 8 surprising to find similar regional management structures in the latter, so our findings may be at 9 least partly transferable. Since our work highlights the vital importance of combining local 10 responsiveness with regional integration in the FMCG manufacturing context, our findings can 11 conceivably inform studies on other industries characterised by similar pressures, such as 12 banking or hospitality. Hence, we believe that further research on distributing HQ functions 13 through RMMs in other sectors is strongly warranted. Ultimately, our study underlines the 14 importance of future work on the roles and functions of headquarters, and encourages looking 15 beyond the question of physical location towards questions about the locus of decision-making 16 roles and functions in the contemporary MNE -contributing to what we believe is a very 17 promising and fruitful avenue for future research. 18 Table 1 
